Current Limited Submissions

Slots: 1

Deadlines

Internal Deadline: Friday, June 20th, 2025

LOI: N/A

External Deadline: July 30th, 2025

Award Information

Award Type: Cooperative Agreement

Estimated Number of Awards: 10

Anticipated Award Amount: from $250,000 to $1,000,000

Link to Award: https://www.grants.gov/search-results-detail/359217

Process for Limited Submissions

PIs must submit their application as a Limited Submission through the Research Initiatives and Infrastructure (RII) Application Portal: https://rii.usc.edu/oor-portal/. Use the template provided here: RII Limited Submission Applicant Template

Materials to submit include:

• (1) Two-Page Proposal Summary (1” margins; single-spaced; standard font type, e.g. Arial, Helvetica, Times New Roman, or Georgia typeface; font size: 11 pt). Page limit includes references and illustrations. Pages that exceed the 2-page limit will be excluded from review. You must use the template linked above.
• (2) CV – (5 pages maximum)

Note: The portal requires information about the PIs in addition to department and contact information, including the 10-digit USC ID#. Please have this material prepared before beginning this application.

Purpose

U.S. adversaries, including China, are seeking advanced and emerging technologies to advance their military capabilities and to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons against the United States. A significant number of foreign governments, public and private research organizations, tech industries, and start-up communities are unaware of dual-use applications of technologies and remain vulnerable to theft and loss of technologies, data, intellectual property (IP), knowledge and talent that can be leveraged for military end uses. For example, semiconductors, which are critical components in a most of today’s electronic devices, are also a critical input for the development of military technologies, WMD and WMD delivery systems, and technologies with potential dual-uses – such as artificial intelligence. In addition to seeking advanced technologies, adversaries exploit commercial and scientific facilities, training centers, and the seas to conduct illegal military operations.

Malign actors use legal and illegal means such as joint commercial ventures, talent recruitment programs, research partnerships/funding, predatory contracting agreements, private equity investments, joint scientific facilities/laboratories, cybertheft, state-sponsored industrial espionage, supply chain diversion, or sales or donation of untrusted hardware and software to acquire foreign intellectual property, conduct dual-use research and development, or conduct military activities under the guise of science diplomacy or commercial activity. Affiliations and links to military entities are often obfuscated or disguised when establishing collaborations and partnerships in order to gain admission and secure visas to study or conduct research on sensitive advanced and emerging technologies at foreign universities; to procure critical equipment and components from unsuspecting or indiscriminate commercial or scientific institutions; or when establishing joint scientific facilities or operating in international business markets.
ISN/CTR seeks to enable key foreign partners to protect critical advanced and emerging technologies from exploitation by our adversaries for military, technological, and economic advancement; secure U.S. intellectual property (IP) abroad; and prevent the exploitation of commercial and scientific partnerships in several key areas, including but not limited to: aerospace and space technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), nanotechnologies, neuroscience, quantum computing and sensing, semiconductors, and smart cities. ISN/CTR also seeks to apply risk reduction tools to more traditional security vulnerabilities that are exploited by proliferator states for military training, geographic influence, etc.

Visit our Institutionally Limited Submission webpage for more updates and other announcements.

Slots: 1

Deadlines

Internal Deadline: Friday, June 20th, 2025, 5pm PT

LOI: N/A

External Deadline: July 30, 2025

Award Information

Award Type: Cooperative Agreement

Estimated Number of Awards: 10

Anticipated Award Amount: from $250,000 to $5,000,000

Link to Award: https://www.grants.gov/search-results-detail/359216

Process for Limited Submissions

PIs must submit their application as a Limited Submission through the Research Initiatives and Infrastructure (RII) Application Portal: https://rii.usc.edu/oor-portal/. Use the template provided here: RII Limited Submission Applicant Template

Materials to submit include:

• (1) Two-Page Proposal Summary (1” margins; single-spaced; standard font type, e.g. Arial, Helvetica, Times New Roman, or Georgia typeface; font size: 11 pt). Page limit includes references and illustrations. Pages that exceed the 2-page limit will be excluded from review. You must use the template linked above.
• (2) CV – (5 pages maximum)

Note: The portal requires information about the PIs in addition to department and contact information, including the 10-digit USC ID#. Please have this material prepared before beginning this application.

Purpose

ISN/CTR’s Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) advances the Trump Administration’s Executive Order (E.O.) on Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research, which pledges to “balance the prevention of catastrophic consequences with maintaining readiness against biological threats and driving global leadership in biotechnology, biological countermeasures, biosecurity, and health research”. In alignment with this E.O., BEP engages partner countries to prevent U.S. adversaries from developing or using biological weapons (BW) against Americans. BEP also protects U.S. biotechnologies, sensitive data, and intellectual property (IP), and bolsters U.S. leadership of global biotechnology markets through private sector engagement to outcompete China, and promotes partner countries’ adoption of U.S. laboratory security, safety, and cybersecurity standards. To successfully achieve this mission, BEP partners include biological and biotechnology laboratories, bio- and data repositories, universities, science and technology organizations or academies, foreign government organizations and entities, biosafety associations or similar professional associations, and private industry. The expertise and tools acquired through BEP engagements are critical to enable our partners to counter the predatory and exploitative efforts of U.S. adversaries that threaten U.S. national and economic security.

Visit our Institutionally Limited Submission webpage for more updates and other announcements.

Slots: 1

Deadlines

Internal Deadline: Friday, June 20th, 2025, 5pm PT

LOI: N/A

External Deadline: July 30, 2025

Award Information

Award Type: Cooperative Agreement

Estimated Number of Awards: 10

Anticipated Award Amount: from $50,000 to $4,000,000

Link to Award: https://www.grants.gov/search-results-detail/359213

Process for Limited Submissions

PIs must submit their application as a Limited Submission through the Research Initiatives and Infrastructure (RII) Application Portal: https://rii.usc.edu/oor-portal/. Use the template provided here: RII Limited Submission Applicant Template

Materials to submit include:

• (1) Two-Page Proposal Summary (1” margins; single-spaced; standard font type, e.g. Arial, Helvetica, Times New Roman, or Georgia typeface; font size: 11 pt). Page limit includes references and illustrations. Pages that exceed the 2-page limit will be excluded from review. You must use the template linked above.
• (2) CV – (5 pages maximum)

Note: The portal requires information about the PIs in addition to department and contact information, including the 10-digit USC ID#. Please have this material prepared before beginning this application.

Purpose

ISN/CTR administers the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Technology Program (FIRST) to enable partner countries’ responsible nuclear energy deployment under the highest nuclear security, safety, and nonproliferation standards. FIRST is ISN’s flagship programmatic tool to advance President Trump’s Executive Order on Unleashing American Energy in global nuclear energy markets. Launched in 2019, FIRST harnesses the power of U.S. public-private partnerships and the innovation of the U.S. nuclear industry to engage partner countries worldwide seeking to build or expand their nuclear energy programs to meet energy needs. Expertise acquired through FIRST workshops, webinars, technical consultancies, study tours, feasibility studies, SMR simulators, regional training hubs, and site visits includes SMR technology selection, SMR deployment roadmaps, SMR fleet deployment regional harmonization initiatives, nuclear security and nonproliferation considerations for SMR deployment, nuclear safety and licensing best practices for advanced reactors, SMR site selection and characterization, nuclear workforce development, stakeholder engagement, preparation for SMR financing, integrating nuclear in the energy mix, planning for responsible spent fuel and SMR waste management, and more. These civil nuclear energy partnerships harness the power of the U.S. nuclear industry to expedite the deployment of safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant SMRs meeting the highest international standards.

Visit our Institutionally Limited Submission webpage for more updates and other announcements.

Slots: 1

Deadlines

Internal Deadline: Friday, June 20th, 2025, 5pm PT

LOI:

External Deadline: July 30, 2025

Award Information

Award Type: Cooperative Agreement

Estimated Number of Awards: 10

Anticipated Award Amount: from $250,000 to $6,500,000

Link to Award: https://www.grants.gov/search-results-detail/359214

Process for Limited Submissions

PIs must submit their application as a Limited Submission through the Research Initiatives and Infrastructure (RII) Application Portal: https://rii.usc.edu/oor-portal/. Use the template provided here: RII Limited Submission Applicant Template

Materials to submit include:

• (1) Two-Page Proposal Summary (1” margins; single-spaced; standard font type, e.g. Arial, Helvetica, Times New Roman, or Georgia typeface; font size: 11 pt). Page limit includes references and illustrations. Pages that exceed the 2-page limit will be excluded from review. You must use the template linked above.
• (2) CV – (5 pages maximum)

Note: The portal requires information about the PIs in addition to department and contact information, including the 10-digit USC ID#. Please have this material prepared before beginning this application.

Purpose

Proliferator states, such as Russia and China, increasingly use the sale of their advanced conventional weapons (ACW) systems as a means to obtain financial resources, exert malign influence, and create strategic defense dependencies. At the same time, countries with existing ACW contracts are seeing these systems operate in Ukraine, as well as experiencing the impact of manufacturing and supply shortages. To adapt to the sanctions against them, Russia has been forced to turn to China to supply the materials, technology, and logistics for their defense industrial base for critical high priority items, creating close networks of collaboration.

China, Russia, and other adversarial states leverage private military and security companies (PMSCs) to facilitate of the flow of weapons and ammunition, destabilize regional and national authorities, exploit natural resources including critical minerals, and harm civilian populations. The award recipient will leverage its network to conduct in-person trainings and workshops informed by open-source research on these subjects. The target audience of in-person trainings and workshops includes individuals from national and regional military and law enforcement groups as well as key policymakers of both domestic and regional groups.

Objectives include planning and organizing in-person technical events on countering proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and private military companies for at least 20-50 stakeholders per event. If more targeted sessions are necessary, ISN/CTR can consider them. The events should aim to engage participants from multiple sectors. The in-person trainings and workshops will be informed by open-source research completed in advance of trainings.

Specific Aim 1: Countering Chinese and Russian Proliferator Procurement Networks

Background: ISN/CTR programming seeks to engage private sector technology manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, and wholesalers, public sector financial intelligence units, and enforcement agencies to counter these illicit networks to help prevent the proliferation of ACW systems and technology from China and to Russia.

Objective: Use commercially-available and open-source data to develop and disseminate reports that help partners to identify components, front companies, and illicit procurement pathways for military-related items in order to de-risk and disrupt those activities. Conduct engagements that enhance partners’ ability to develop and utilize open-source data to identify high-risk transactions, suspicious corporate activities, and procurement networks of military applicable components to proliferator states.

Objective: Engage private sector technology manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, and wholesalers on tools and resourced to enhance due diligence for procurement practices, know your customer s customer [KYC(C)], and specific commodities (such as polymers, printed circuit boards, Surface Mount Technology (SMT) equipment, etc.), with military applications.

Objective: Engage major machine tool, microelectronic, semiconductor, and other high-end dual-use manufacturers to raise awareness on the risk of illicit entities seeking to invest or engage in joint ventures with primary or sub-tier supply chain companies involved in the design, production, or sale of these technologies.

Objective: Improve private-public partnership, data sharing, and other types of collaboration.

Objective: Develop and disseminate commercially-available, open-source information to identify high-risk defense networks and exports to include: the methods, vessels, and aircraft facilitating these transactions, and the trade restrictions and sanction risks associated with transacting with these entities.

Specific Aim 2: Countering Chinese and Russian Proliferation of ACW

Background: Proliferator states, such as Russia and China increasingly use the sale of their advanced conventional weapons systems as a means to obtain financial resources, exert malign influence, and create strategic defense dependencies. By analyzing and exposing global proliferator state-linked defense networks, public and private sector stakeholders can avoid predatory business venture risks, identify potential high-risk transactions, and help to ensure compliance with international sanctions. In addition, proliferator states use the development and sale of ACW systems as part of its strategy of self-reliance to access and help produce high-end technologies that enable its own military modernization efforts.

Objective: Raise awareness in the public and private sector on designated proliferator-state linked defense entities seeking to establish business operations or joint ventures in foreign countries for defense sector and ACW sale purposes. Share commercially available information to proliferator-state linked defense networks, the methods, vessels, and aircraft facilitating these transactions, and the trade restrictions and sanction risks associated with transacting with these entities.

Objective: Support key business consultation firms to provide peer-to-peer engagements with foreign private sector partners to limit corporate risks and exposure to sanctioned, prohibited, or otherwise high-risk defense firms linked to proliferator states.

Specific Aim 3: Addressing Strategic Defense Dependencies

Background: When foreign governments procure weapons systems from proliferator states through predatory agreements, it forces the recipient country into a long-term contract and defense dependencies. This undermines the recipient’s ability to make independent defense choices while expanding malign influence of the proliferator state. These efforts focus on countries with historical ties to, and dependencies on, Russian and Chinese weapons systems.

Objective: Develop and disseminate technical reports focused on the hidden costs of doing business with Russian and Chinese defense firms (to include repairs, spare-parts, corruption, long-term deals that bind countries to strategic reliance in international forum, inflated costs over time, and impact of potential sanctions), and ACW functional and operational limitations.

Objective: Support technical defense consultations to identify pragmatic defense diversification procurement opportunities. Develop technical analyses for partner countries on defense-related infrastructure, manufacturing, human capital, and supply chains, to explore diversification opportunities.

Specific Aim 4: Countering Malign Activity by Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC):

Background: Private military and security companies contribute to the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and malign activity that goes against the interests of U.S. national security priorities and the interests of U.S. allies abroad, such as Chinese encroachment and exploitation in WHA. Unregulated mercenary security groups often operate contrary to international norms. These entities are also used to propagate foreign malign influence, undermine national security interests of host countries, destabilize regions, and exploit natural resources such as critical minerals while invoking violence and civilian harm.

Objective: Assist key defense, security, law enforcement, and private sector entities to professionalize and standardize best practices during the solicitation, procurement, and oversight processes when obtaining PMSC services. Simultaneously, focus in-person training content on promoting American alternatives to the use of known unaccountable mercenary groups

Objective: Promote implementation of international PMSC procurement best practices and due-diligence measures including adoption of standards outlined in the Montreux document and International Code of Conduct Association (ICOCA).

Objective: Implement tailored in-person engagements that provide the target audience with case studies, open-source training tools, and research methodologies to identify PMSCs involved in extralegal acts described above. This would include open-source data and information on PMSC deployments, modes of transport, financing, subsidiary, and logistics networks facilitating PMSC deployments to public and private sector partner enforcement officials

Objective: Demonstrate disadvantages of Chinese and Russian companies securing and exploiting critical natural resources, including critical minerals and their ties to PMSCs.

Visit our Institutionally Limited Submission webpage for more updates and other announcements.